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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical investigation of the role of the financial sector in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). This topic is of particular interest because non-regulated entities are likely to have 
played an important part in increasing the efficiency of the EU ETS by reducing trading transaction 
costs and providing other services. Due to various reasons (new rules and regulations, reduced return 
prospects, VAT fraud investigations) banks have reduced their engagement in EU Emissions Trading 
and it is unclear how this will impact on the functioning of the carbon market. Our regression analysis 
based on data from the EU Transaction Log shows that large companies and companies with 
extensive trading experience are more likely to interact with the financial sector, which is why we 
expect banks’ pulling out of the EU ETS to affect larger companies more significantly. The semi-
structured interviews we conducted with representatives of the financial sector, as well as companies 
liable under the EU ETS, confirm that banks were involved in the EU carbon market in various 
capacities, specifically as hedging partners for larger companies in the energy sector. Whether this 
particular role may be taken on by other financial players is unknown at this stage.  
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 Introduction  1.
Textbook theory of emissions trading usually focusses on trading activities of regulated entities. In reality, 
however, non-regulated entities are also actively involved in the market for emission allowances. They often act 
as intermediaries and can improve market efficiency by reducing transaction costs for regulated entities (Stavins 
1995). To better understand their different roles is important, given that policy makers in countries that have 
introduced emissions trading (e.g., South Korea) are more and more reluctant to facilitate the involvement of non-
regulated entities, which may be one of the reasons for the relatively low trading volumes observed for those 
schemes (Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 2016). The reasons for this reluctance may be findings that non-
regulated entities such as banks and exchanges have supported VAT fraud worth more than 3 billion euros in lost 
sales tax revenue to European governments (Frunza and Guegan 2011; Wei and Betz 2016). 
In the context of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the financial sector has been particularly active on 
the market for EU Allowances (EUAs) while many of the regulated entities do not get involved in the market at all 
(Betz and Schmidt 2015). Our analysis of data from the EU Transaction Log (EUTL) highlights the importance of 
financial actors and dedicated trading accounts of large companies in the market, which were jointly responsible 
for about two-thirds of the 1.8 million traded EUAs during the first trading period (2005-2007).
1
 In fact, 45% of that 
volume involved one or two accounts of non-regulated entities. As illustrated in Table 1, more than half of this 
volume goes through accounts of banks (24% of the total), via exchanges (8 %), and through a dedicated future 
clearing account (London Clearing House – LCH, 6%), the remainder via brokers, (own-account) trading houses, 
and trusts and pension funds (7%). 
 
 Bank Exchange LCH Clearnet Broker/Trader/Other 
Million EUA 844 287 225 248 
% of total 24% 8% 6% 7% 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
 
So far, the literature on the role of the financial sector in emissions trading is relatively sparse. Schopp and 
Neuhoff (2013) assessed the hedging behavior of liable companies (in particular utilities) in the EU ETS. They 
found that financial actors are often partners of electricity companies hedging their future electricity sales. 
However, that study is based solely on interviews rather than on historical data, focusing on the electricity sector 
rather than on its hedging partners. Neuhoff et al. (2015) assessed hedging behavior and the volume of hedges in 
order to project developments with regard to the demand for allowances (and surplus of allowances over time) in 
the context of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) to be introduced in the EU ETS in 2019 (EU 2015). Again, the 
different roles of financial actors were not the focus of this research. Pana (forthcoming) analyzed the influence of 
different market participants on volatility using EUTL data and found that the financial sector was active during 
times of particularly low and high volatility, which reflects the important role of banks and other financial 
intermediaries as service providers in the market. However, that study did not assess the different types of 
services they offered. Several other authors have analyzed EUTL transfer data (Jaraitė-Kažukauskė and 
                                                          
1
  We only used trades that did not involve a government account (‘administrative transfers’ vs. ‘market transfers’) and that focused on 
transactions taking place between two different companies rather than between two accounts belonging to the same company. 
Table 1 Total amount of EUAs transferred through accounts of financial actors during the first trading period 
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Kažukauskas 2015; Jong et al. 2013; Martino and Trotignon 2013; Zaklan 2013), but without describing the role of 
banks and other financial actors in the EU ETS in any detail.  
The scope of this paper is wider than that of previous studies. It addresses the research gap related to the 
behavior of financial actors in the EU ETS as identified by previous studies (Betz and Schmidt 2015; Jaraitė-
Kažukauskė and Kažukauskas 2015; Wallner et al. 2014; Zaklan 2013) by exploring the following research 
questions:  
 First, what types of financial actors are particularly relevant as trading partners for which liable entities?  
 Second, given the importance of banks compared to other financial actors, what, specifically, are their 
different roles in EU emissions trading?  
To answer these question, descriptive and regression analysis was performed on EUTL data from the first trading 
period of the EU ETS. In addition, interviews were conducted to elaborate on our data analysis. This allowed us to 
understand more recent developments beyond the first trading period of the EU ETS, which is particularly relevant 
since the introduction of MiFID prompted many banks to shut down their carbon trading desks at the start of the 
third trading period. Some banks had already left the market or reduced their activities when prices dropped, 
which made services less attractive (Wallner et al. 2014), or they were concerned about reputational risk from 
getting involved in VAT carousel fraud. 
Our regression analysis indicates that large companies are more likely to engage in trades involving a range of 
financial players, in particular banks or exchanges. Smaller companies (such as those with lower emissions and 
those without special trading accounts), on the other hand, are more likely to sell emission permits to a broker. 
Thus, it seems that the changes due to MiFID have a higher impact on larger companies, which may need to find 
new hedging partners, while the impact on smaller companies is less severe. 
Based on our data analysis and the interviews we conducted, we found that banks have played a variety of roles 
in the EU ETS: First, they acted as intermediaries to facilitate trading similar to brokers. Second, they directly 
managed accounts of their clients. Third, they published information about the market (market analysis). Fourth, 
they provided liquidity to the market as market makers. Fifth, they traded on their own account in order to 
generate profits (speculation). Sixth, they seem to have borrowed permits from companies, returning them with 
interest (i.e., not buying them but using them as speculative capital). Seventh, they were involved in maturity 
swaps for companies that preferred to raise cash by selling their permits and buying derivatives from the 
proceeds. Eighth, they helped liable companies to swap EUAs against Kyoto units. Ninth, they aggregated 
volumes by buying from many small companies and selling to larger clients. Tenth, they acted as hedging 
counterparties for regulated companies. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the data and includes a 
descriptive analysis of typologies of participants and trades, as well as the summary statistics of the dataset used 
in the regression analysis. Section 3 presents the methodologies applied. Section 4 includes the regression 
results. Section 5 describes the different roles of financial actors in EU emissions trading, with a particular focus 
on banks. A conclusion is provided in Section 6.  
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 Data 2.
The EUTL is an electronic database managed by the European Commission that records all transactions of 
European Union Allowances (EUAs), Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), and Emissions Reduction Units 
(ERUs) carried out under the EU ETS, including the allocation and surrendering of allowances, but also all trades 
taking place between market participants. Due to the delay with which the data is published (previously five years, 
now three) and the substantial work involved in cleaning and augmenting the dataset (see also Jaraite et al. 
2013), we employ data covering the whole first trading period (January 2005 – April 2008). April is chosen as an 
endpoint to the period as companies have to submit the allowances required for the previous year by the end of 
April of the following year, which results in a true-up period at the end of the first trading period (January 2008 to 
the end of April 2008). A further reason for focusing on this timeframe in the context of the data analysis is that 
trading volumes recorded during the second trading period (in particularly in 2009 and 2010) are distorted due to 
the large-scale VAT carousel fraud that took place mainly in the spot market for EUAs (Frunza and Guegan 2011; 
Wei and Betz 2016). 
The EUTL contains additional information on the account holders that are party to a specific transaction. Besides 
government accounts, two different types can be observed: Operator Holding Accounts (OHAs) for all installations 
liable under the EU ETS and Person Holding Accounts (PHAs). PHAs are opened voluntarily, mostly as dedicated 
trading accounts of large regulated firms (in addition to their OHAs) or by non-regulated firms, most of which 
belong to the financial sector. These individual accounts were matched to parent companies for the purposes of 
this analysis. We drew on the information provided by the European University Institute (EUI) (Jaraite et al. 2013) 
that links OHAs and PHAs via their IDs to IDs in the company database ORBIS and their ‘Global Ultimate Owner’ 
(GUO), and we complement their aggregation efforts by additional desktop research, specifically focusing on 
financial actors.  
We were thus able to divide the financial sector into three broad groups: 
 Banks 
 Exchanges (with the London Clearing House shown separately for some purposes) 
 Brokers / trading houses / others (e.g., funds, insurance companies, or private persons) = ‘BTO’. 
 
Figure 1 below shows all those market transfers of Period I units that a PHA belonging to a financial entity was 
involved in. In general, financial accounts are most active at the beginning and end of each year, with a calmer 
period during the year. This probably has to do with the fact that December is the standard month when forward 
and future contracts are delivered and that by April liable entities have to surrender permits for the previous year’s 
emissions. The special role of banks, among all financial actors, becomes evident. In December 2006 and 2007 – 
when the maturity dates for the standard forward and futures contracts fell – accounts belonging to banks 
transferred more EUAs than they acquired. This indicates that banks acted as hedging counterparties that 
delivered the amounts sold in these contracts in December. In the months leading up to December, on the other 
hand, accounts belonging to banks acquired more than they transferred, which indicates that these accounts 
bought the permits necessary to fulfill those contracts in December. All futures traded on the ECX (the most liquid 
futures exchange at the time) had to be cleared through the London Clearing House (LCH) (Martino and 
Trotignon 2013). This is why the LCH account exhibited a unique pattern, where large amounts of EUAs flowed 
into and out of this account in December 2006 and 2007 (see also Betz and Schmidt 2015). 
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Figure 1 Market transfers involving accounts belonging to the financial sector 
 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
Note: For ease of illustration, and as volumes were initially very small, transactions are shown as starting in September 2005. The chart only 
shows ‘market transfers’ and transfers between two accounts not belonging to the same company. 
 
2.1. TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPANTS 
More than 11,000 accounts of liable entities were active during the first period of the EU ETS (meaning they were 
either allocated allowances, had verified emissions or appeared in the transfer dataset, or all of the above; see 
Table 2 below). For these 11,000 installations, 4,783 liable parent companies could be identified. 4,608 of the 
liable companies only own operator holding accounts (OHAs), while 175 of them also have person holding 
accounts (PHAs).
2
 At the same time, 1,078 PHAs actively participated in EU emissions trading during its first 
period. 472 of them were associated with a company that was also liable under the EU ETS. 606 PHAs were 
opened by entities that did not have liability under the EU ETS; this number can be aggregated to 433 at company 
level. 
  
                                                          
2
  It has to be noted that a number of banks also own OHAs and were therefore counted towards the 175 companies owning both OHAs and 
PHAs. This includes the following: ABENGOA S.A., ACCIONA S.A, BARCLAYS PLC, Dexia, EFFICIENCY DIRECT LIMITED, AGEAS SA/NV, 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, and UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE SCPA. 
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Table 2 Accounts and entities active during the first period of EU emissions trading 
OHAs / Liable Entities 
Number of OHAs active in 
1st TP 
Number of parent 
companies owning at least 
one OHA 
Number of parent 
companies owning only 
OHAs 
Number of parent 
companies owning both 
OHAs and PHAs 
11,141 4,783 4,608 175 
PHAs / Non-Liable Entities 
Number of PHAs active in 
1st TP 
Number of PHAs associated 
with liable entity 
Number of PHAs not 
associated with liable entity 
Number of parent 
companies owning only 
PHAs 
1,078 472 606 433 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
 
The list of the most active banks during the first period of the EU ETS (see Table 3) reads like a who’s who of the 
financial world. It also reveals a challenge in analyzing EUTL data, namely the fact that Barclays Bank, for 
example, seemingly sold more EUAs than it bought. In particular, one account of Barclays Bank transferred 8 
million more allowances than it had acquired. Personal communication with the European Commission revealed 
that the main issue with transactions missing from the dataset is that in some cases, the ‘status’ of transfers 
changed from ‘not completed’ to ‘completed’ without it being recorded on the EUTL, and the transaction was 
therefore not displayed. Missing data also seems to have been responsible for higher sales volumes compared to 
purchase volumes for some of the other financial actors, although to a lesser extent. However, given the relatively 
small volumes of the missing data, we did not consider them to have a major impact on our findings. 
On the other hand, we also observed banks that acquired more permits than they eventually sold. This applies, 
for example, to Morgan Stanley or Merrill Lynch. These banks may have pursued a strategy that led to a loss: 
Buying early at high prices and then being unable to sell all permits (or having to sell them at very low prices at 
the end of the period). The German bank KfW represents a special case. It bought permits on behalf of the 
German government in order to replenish the German new entrants reserve at the end of the first trading period. 
These permits were acquired mainly from other banks (e.g., from Barclays, Unicredit, and from auctions of Period 
I permits) and then transferred to the German government. In compensation, the KfW bank was given Period II 
permits by the German government, which it could sell on futures markets. 
Banks often opened accounts in the British or French registries. This has to do with the fact that important 
exchanges (e.g., BlueNext or EEX) or clearing houses (e.g., LCH or ECX) were situated in those countries. For 
example, BlueNext required banks to hold an account in the same (in this case, French) registry. The majority of 
banks do not hold any OHA accounts. One prominent exception is Unicredit, which holds OHA accounts of sugar 
factories and is, therefore, an example of a bank that directly manages the liabilities of a company. 
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Table 3 Banks with total trading volume > 1 M EUA in the first period of EU emissions trading 
Name of company 
Volume of 
purchase 
(M EUA) 
Volume of 
sales  
(M EUA) 
Number of 
accounts 
(PHA/OHA) 
Accounts opened in 
registries  
BARCLAYS PLC 77  83  9 / 3 
GB, NL, DE, FR, ES, DK, 
IT 
UBS AG 74  71  4 / 0 FR, GB 
AGEAS SA/NV 44  44  9 / 3 NL, GB, FR 
Calyon Financial 40  40  2 / 0 FR, GB 
BNP PARIBAS 24  22  3 / 1 GB, FR 
MORGAN STANLEY 23  20  11 / 1 GB, DK, NL, DE, FR 
SOCIETE GENERALE 19  18  4 / 0 GB, CZ, FR 
COMMERZBANK AG 17  17  3 / 0 FR, DE, GB 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC 16  16  8 / 0 ES, GB, NL, DK 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC 11  15  3 / 1 GB, NL 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. 13  11  4 / 0 FR, GB 
UNICREDIT SPA 11  12  3 / 8 PL, DE 
KFW BANKENGRUPPE 19  0  5 / 0 DE 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11  8  7 / 1 GB, DE, ES 
SAL. OPPENHEIM JR. & CIE. AG & CO. KGAA 9  9  2 / 0 DE, FR 
SAS RUE LA BOETIE 7  7  3 / 1 GB, FR 
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 6  5  7 / 0 FR, GB 
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES LLC, THE 2  2  1 / 0 GB 
Royal Bank of Canada 2  2  2 / 0 GB 
BANQUE DEGROOF SA 2  2  1 / 0 BE 
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. 3  0  2 / 0 GB 
BANK OF IRELAND 1  1  2 / 0 GB, IE 
NATIXIS 1  1  5 / 0 GB, FR 
BAYERNLB HOLDING AG 1  0.4  2 / 1 DE 
KBC GROEP NV/ KBC GROUPE SA 1  1  3 / 0 SK, CZ 
Sampo Bank 1  1  1 / 0 FR 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB 0.4  0.4  1 / 0 GB 
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG 0.4  0.3  4 / 0 GB, FR 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA SA 0.4  0.2  1 / 0 ES 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
 
All exchanges and clearing houses that were active during the first trading period are shown in Table 4 below. 
Note that organized exchanges did not develop until mid-2005, with EEX/Eurex (Germany) being the first to offer 
EUA spot contracts from 9 March 2005, followed by BlueNext (France) and EXAA in June 2005, and NordPool in 
October 2005 (Ellerman et al. 2010, p.134). The largest overall volume was transferred through one account 
belonging to the London Clearing House (LCH). As mentioned before, LCH is the clearing house associated with 
the clearing of future contracts traded on the ECX. The most liquid exchanges for spot contracts were BlueNext –
which was called Powernext until 2007 – and NordPool. 
In which countries the exchanges operated also played a role in the respective country’s exposure to VAT fraud. 
The countries which were hit hardest by illegal activity of this kind (i.e., France, UK, and Germany) are countries 
where exchanges were situated (Wei and Betz 2016). 
In total, we observed about 510 million Period I EUAs transacted into and out of accounts of exchanges. For the 
time span from January 2005 to April 2008, Point Carbon estimates exchanged volumes of 960 million. The fact 
that this number is higher reflects the fact that the EUTL only records physical transfers of allowances. This 
means that in the case of forwards and futures, only the physical delivery is recorded, rather than the trade of the 
contracts, which may have been sold and resold (see also Section 5). 
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Some exchanges seem to have attracted a large number of liable parties to trade directly. The most prominent 
example is SendeCO2, where a lot of liable companies from the Spanish ceramics industry transact directly with 
the exchange. At the EEX, where we counted 74 different liable companies, a lot of small German utilities 
(“Stadtwerke”) were observed making transactions with this exchange. We also found that it was not necessarily 
dedicated trading accounts of companies (PHAs) but often the installation’s direct account that carried out 
transactions with the exchange. In general, exchanges that also offer products in the electricity sector, e.g., 
NordPool and EEX, attract a lot of liable companies from this sector. This may be because those companies had 
already met prequalification requirements to trade at this exchange and could, therefore, start trading another 
product (i.e., emission permits) without going through the process again. 
 
Table 4 Exchanges and clearing houses active during the first period of EU emissions trading 
Name (Location) Products offered 
Volume of 
purchase 
(M EUA) 
Volume 
of sales  
(M EUA) 
Number of active participants at the exchange 
ICE / LCH Clearnet (UK) futures 113  113  Banks: 16; B/T/O: 4; Liable: 3 
BlueNext SA (France) spot and futures 66  66  Banks: 9 ; B/T/O: 21; Exchange: 1; Liable: 31 
NordPool (Norway) spot and futures 41  41  Banks: 4; B/T/O: 7; Liable: 55 
Climex (Netherlands) 15  17  Banks: 3; B/T/O: 11; Exchange: 2; Liable: 22 
EEX (Germany) spot and futures 12  12  Bank: 1; B/T/O: 11; Liable: 74 
SENDECO2 (Spain) 6  6  Banks: 3; B/T/O: 5; Exchange:1; Liable: 222 
CEB (Slovakia) 1  1  B/T/O: 4; Liable: 28 
Mercatoelettrico (Italy) 1  1  B/T/O: 7; Liable:15 
EXAA (Austria) spot 0.5  0.4  B/T/O: 3; Liable: 5 
POLPX (Poland) 0.1  0.1  B/T/O: 2; Liable: 4 
Chicago Climate Exchange (US) 0.0001  0  Liable: 1 
Czech Moravian Commodity Exchange 
Kladno (Czech Republic) 0.00002  0.00001  B/T/O: 2; Liable: 1 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
Note: BlueNext was founded in December 2007 when NYSE Euronext and Caisse des Dépôts purchased the carbon market from PowerNext. ICE 
used to be called ECX. B/T/O = Brokers / Trading Houses / Others  
 
Exchanges may also strategically choose a small country for their clearing subsidiaries due to VAT reasons. EEX, 
for example, clears its transactions through a subsidiary in Luxembourg (European Commodity Clearing 
Luxembourg). This is because the exchange buys most of the allowances within the country where VAT applies 
and sells the allowances across borders, which are VAT free. The EEX would have to finance the excess VAT in 
advance, but with its clearing house being located in a small country most trades are VAT free and will not need 
any VAT management by EEX (ECC 2009). 
Using data from the EUTL, Figure 2 illustrates the physical amounts going into and out of the accounts of the 
BlueNext spot exchange. Volumes slowly started to pick up at the end of 2005 / beginning of 2006 and were 
generally highest at the end of 2006 / beginning of 2007. As prices dropped towards 0, trading volumes started to 
decrease again, but trades in Period I permits were being carried out through this exchange right up to the end of 
the first trading period (ending with the surrendering deadline at the end of April 2008).  
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Figure 2 Transactions involving accounts of the Bluenext exchange 
 
Source: EUTL, Point Carbon, own estimation and illustration 
 
Table 5 shows the brokerage and trading houses with the largest volumes traded during the first period of the EU 
ETS. According to Wallner et al. (2014), trading houses trade allowances as an investment and therefore often 
hold large positions (1-5 M EUAs) themselves, as an internal strategy. In contrast, brokerage companies focus on 
brokerage activities which may or may not involve permits being transferred through their own account. Given that 
we only observed physical transactions that were carried out our list of brokers or volumes observed in the EUTL 
itself may be incomplete as brokerage companies may have only facilitated trades, without being involved in the 
physical transaction of permits. 
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Table 5 Brokers and trading houses with total trading volumes > 2 M EUA in the first period of EU emissions 
trading 
Name of company 
Volume of 
purchase  
(M EUA) 
Volume of 
sales  
(M EUA) 
Wallich 14  14  
CONSUS S.A. 12  12  
Vertis 10  9  
carboncapitalmarkets 8  8  
Sempra Energy Europe Limited (SEEL) 8  8  
STX Services 8  7  
Nordea 7  7  
PCE Investors 8  4  
GreenStream  5  5  
Climatecorp 4  5  
Atlantik 3  3  
Blackstonegv 4  1  
ECOPROGRESSO 2  2  
SYNECO GMBH & CO. KG 2  2  
E&T ENERGIE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT M.B.H. 2  1  
Carbon Warehouse 1  1  
ECO WAY 1  1  
NEAS ENERGY A/S 1  1  
NATSOURCE LLC 1  1  
Jane Street 2  0.6  
Grup Rigaut 33 1  1  
WIND TO MARKET 1  1  
EcoWay 1  1  
GEMB GESELLSCHAFT FUER EMISSIONSMANAGEMENT UND BERATUNG MBH 1  0.9  
Stenmore Financial Ltd. 0.9  0.9  
CM CAPITAL MARKETS HOLDING SA 0.9  0.7  
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
 
2.2. TYPOLOGY OF TRADES 
Prior to conducting a regression analysis (Section 4), we investigated the volumes traded between different types 
of market participants. During the first trading period, liable companies had the largest transaction volume directly 
with other liable companies (Figure 3), followed by transactions with banks, exchanges, and brokers. About twice 
the volume that was transacted between liable companies was transacted between purely financial players. 
These transactions included clearing activities, such as through the LCH, trading on behalf of liable clients, or 
speculation on the part of the financial entities.  
As mentioned above, physical market transactions of EUAs cluster around the end of the year – and to some 
extent around the time when permits need to be surrendered. As Figure 3 illustrates, the involvement of financial 
actors in the trading activities of liable companies increased over time and purely financial player transfers took 
place especially in December, the time of futures clearing via LCH. The different roles of banks in futures trading 
are explained in more detail in Section 5.  
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Figure 3 Trading partners in first period EU emissions trading over time 
 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
 
2.3. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The regression analysis enabled us to investigate with which types of financial actors liable companies carry out 
transactions. To this end, we used a dataset that included all companies liable during the first trading period and 
recorded whether they sold to, or bought from, banks, brokers, or exchanges. Although Barclays Bank is 
responsible for three OHAs, it was excluded from the analysis because of the problem with the missing transfers 
(see Section 2.1). As was shown earlier, banks were the most important financial traders in terms of volumes 
traded (Table 1). As Table 6 indicates, however, brokers were far ahead in terms of numbers of distinct trading 
partners among liable companies. While 9% of all liable companies sold to banks and 5% bought from banks, 
19% and 13% did so with brokers.
3
 
  
                                                          
3
 Please note that the term ‘broker’ used in this section refers to the category of ‘Broker/Trader/Other’ established earlier. 
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Table 6 Summary statistics of variables used in regression analysis 
 Observations Mean Min Max 
Sold to bank 4,783 0.09 0 1 
Bought from bank 4,783 0.05 0 1 
Sold to broker 4,783 0.19 0 1 
Bought from broker 4,783 0.13 0 1 
Sold to exchange 4,783 0.05 0 1 
Bought from exchange 4,783 0.06 0 1 
Traded 4,783 0.63 0 1 
Number of trades 3,002 12.70 1 2,986 
Short 4,783 0.27 0 1 
Has PHA  4,783 0.04 0 1 
Number of accounts 4,783 2.41 1 216 
ln (maximum emissions) 4,783 10.02 1 19 
ln (absolute position) 4,783 9.53 0 18 
Electricity 4,783 0.10 0 1 
Other combustion 4,783 0.53 0 1 
Refineries 4,783 0.01 0 1 
Iron, steel 4,783 0.03 0 1 
Cement 4,783 0.03 0 1 
Glass 4,783 0.04 0 1 
Ceramics 4,783 0.16 0 1 
Paper 4,783 0.10 0 1 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
 
Next, in order to determine which characteristics influence a company’s decision to sell or buy from either a bank, 
a broker, or an exchange, we used explanatory variables related to a company’s sector, based on the NACE code 
of installations with the majority of emissions owned by this company (European Commission 2014), its size 
(measured by the logarithm of the year with the highest emissions in 2005-2007), the number of accounts the 
company owns, whether or not it has a PHA, whether it was short or long, and by to what extent and the number 
of trades carried out by this company.  
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 Methods 3.
Two different methods are used to answer the two main research questions. We use regression analysis to 
examine which types of liable companies interacted with different financial actors most frequently during the first 
trading period of the EU ETS. We also conducted a number of semi-structured interviews with key players active 
in EU emissions trading in order to better understand the various roles of different actors and gather insights on 
how the situation developed after the first trading period had ended. In this context, we interviewed both current 
and former employees of banks and electricity companies and tried to cover both large and small and both 
multinational and regional entities. It was somewhat challenging to find interview partners as many of the relevant 
persons had already left their positions following a reduction of involvement in EU emissions trading, in particular 
by banks. 
Regarding the regression analysis, we decided to model the decision of a liable company to trade or not to trade 
with a specific financial actor using a probit model with a binary outcome, where y2
∗ describes the propensity to 
trade with a certain actor (unobservable to us) and y2  reflects the binary outcome we observed (trade / no trade 
with a particular actor). 
y2
∗ =  x2
′ β2 + u2  
𝑦2 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦2
∗ ≤ 0
 
Since not all the companies (in fact, only 63% of them) did any trading at all, be it with or without financial 
intermediaries, we decided to model the decision to sell or buy from one of the financial entities as a two-step 
process: In a first step, a company decides whether or not to engage in trading at all, and in a second step 
whether to trade with one of the financial intermediaries.  
y1
∗ =  x1
′ β1 + u1   
𝑦1 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ ≤ 0
 
In this context, y1
∗ represents the propensity to trade. Therefore, the binary outcome y1 indicates whether a 
company traded or not during the first period. The outcome y2, in turn, can only be observed for companies that 
did any trading. In other words, in this model setup, y2 can only be observed if y1
∗ > 0: 
𝑦2 =  {
( 𝑦2
∗ > 0) 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0
𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ ≤ 0
 
Cov(u1 , u2) = ρ 
If unobserved characteristics exist which are correlated both with variables that influence the decision whether or 
not to trade and with variables that determine the decision to trade with a certain type of financial actor, estimating 
them separately would lead to omitted variable bias. Only if the errors are uncorrelated and 𝜌 = 0 would it be 
correct to estimate the equation for 𝑦2 separately. Since it is likely that companies are not randomly selected into 
trading or not trading and, in particular, that unobserved variables affecting this (self-)selection also have a 
significant effect on the companies’ decision to trade with a certain type of financial actor, a correlation in the 
errors of the separate estimations needs to be taken into account. This can be done by applying a probit model 
that accounts for self-selection (Heckman 1979; Van de Ven and Van Praag 1981). 
In general, the same regressors can be included in both the selection and the outcome equation. However, if this 
is the case, the identification relies on the nonlinear functional form of the selection equation and the specification 
may, therefore, be fragile. Therefore, exclusion restrictions, i.e., variables that determine the decision of whether 
or not to trade, but not the decision which type(s) of intermediaries to trade with, may be desirable (Puhani 2000). 
Following Pinkse et al. (forthcoming), we used the logarithm of the absolute value of the allocation position (= total 
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amount of allowances allocated during the first trading period – total emissions in the same period) as an 
exclusion restriction for identification. It is important to note that this variable influences the decision to engage in 
trading but does not have an effect on the decision to trade with a particular financial intermediary. The decision 
of whether or not to engage in trading depends on whether a company views the potential payoff related to 
trading higher than the potential risks/costs associated with trading. A high absolute value of the allocation 
position implies a high level of either over- or underallocation. While a high level of overallocation would imply 
higher potential gains following a decision to engage in trading as these could be sold on the market, a high level 
of underallocation implies large costs associated with not engaging in the market (i.e., paying a penalty). We, 
therefore, expected this variable to have a positive influence on the decision of whether or not to engage in 
trading. Regarding the assumption that the variable is not correlated with the decision to buy to or sell from a 
certain financial actor, we assumed that the absolute value of over- or underallocation should not necessarily 
influence the decision with which type of financial actor to trade, except via the size channel, which we controlled 
for in the outcome equation. Furthermore, the outcome variable differentiates between purchases and sales. 
While the absolute value of over- or underallocation is expected to influence the decision to trade or not, it should 
not correlate highly with the decision to either sell or buy. 
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 Regression Analysis 4.
Regression results are displayed in Table 7. The short dummy is significant and has the expected sign, i.e., if a 
company was short it was more likely to buy from any of the financial intermediaries, while if it was long, it was 
significantly more likely to sell to any of the financial actors. Using the logarithm of maximum emissions as a 
measure of the size of a company indicates that larger companies were more likely to engage in trading activities 
with any of the financial intermediaries, with one exception: Smaller companies (again measured by emissions) 
were significantly more likely to engage in selling to a broker.  
Whether or not a company had opened a PHA seems important as it may increase the likelihood of the company 
engaging in trades with both banks and exchanges. However, the coefficients are insignificant for regressions 
involving a broker. This might again point to the fact that smaller companies or companies with less trading 
experience that did not open a PHA were equally likely to interact with brokers but less likely to interact with 
banks or exchanges. The impact of the sector dummies is varied and no clear pattern emerges. Against the 
reference category of electricity generation, other sectors seem to be less likely to interact with exchanges. This 
does not, however, hold for ceramics. On the other hand, cement and glass companies seem to be more likely to 
engage in trades with banks than electricity generating companies. This may be due to the fact that some sectors 
are quite heterogeneous. (Consider, for example, the German electricity market with its four large and many small 
utilities.) 
Turning to the selection equation, as expected a higher absolute amount of the allocation position was found to 
have a positive effect on the decision to engage in trading. The size of a company, if measured by verified 
emissions and the number of accounts, also has a positive impact on the decision to engage in trading, although 
the level of verified emissions is only marginally significant. It can also be noted that a number of sectors are 
significantly less likely to engage in trading at all when compared to the reference category of electricity 
generation. Rho is significant in a number of the regressions indicating that the selection process may indeed play 
an important role, although not for all of the regressions run. (See below where we checked this by running a 
simple probit regression). 
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Table 7 Regression results: Probit model with sample selection 
 Sold to bank 
Bought 
from bank 
Sold to 
broker 
Bought 
from broker 
Sold to 
exchange 
Bought 
from 
exchange 
Short -0.63*** 0.47*** -0.67*** 0.45*** -0.61*** 0.54*** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) 
ln(maximum emissions) 0.14*** 0.20*** -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.04 0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Number of accounts 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.01*** -0.005 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.005) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.005) 
Has PHA  0.40*** 0.41*** 0.07 -0.02 0.67*** 0.68*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
Number of trades 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Other combustion 0.27*** 0.20 0.04 0.05 -0.31*** -0.05 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) 
Refineries -0.07 0.01 -0.10 -0.36 -1.05** -0.20 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24) (0.41) (0.29) 
Iron, steel 0.23 0.23 0.05 -0.23 -0.62** -0.43 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.27) 
Cement 0.43** 0.05** 0.42*** 0.16 -0.20 -0.11 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21) 
Glass 0.63*** 0.47*** -0.16 -0.13 -0.18 0.23 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.18) 
Ceramics 0.15 -0.10 0.34*** 0.05 0.24* 0.62*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
Paper 0.16 -0.28 0.05 -0.04 -0.36** 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15) 
Constant -2.35*** -4.27*** 0.78*** -2.16*** -1.44*** -3.12*** 
 (0.53) (0.30) (0.19) (0.17) (0.47) (0.26) 
Selection equation 
ln(absolute position) 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(maximum emissions) 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Number of accounts 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other combustion -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Refineries -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Iron, steel -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Cement -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.38*** -0.40*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Glass -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Ceramics -0.16** -0.17** -0.17** -0.18** -0.17** -0.18** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Paper -0.15 -0.16** -0.15* -0.18** -0.16* -0.17* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant -0.98*** -0.93*** -1.06*** -0.95*** -0.94*** -0.93*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
rho -0.62*** 1.00 -0.85*** 0.89*** -0.30 0.89 
p-value LR test (0.005) (0.11) (0.001) (0.000) (0.25) (0.10) 
Observations 3002 (4783) 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (***significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *significant at the 90% level) 
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These results imply that, generally, companies with high emission volumes are generally more likely to interact 
with financial actors. The important exception is selling to a broker. Companies with fewer emissions are more 
likely to interact with these players. Furthermore, the coefficient of whether or not a liable company opened a PHA 
indicates that if it did, it is again more likely to interact with banks or exchanges, but that a company without a 
PHA is equally likely to engage in trades involving brokers. Assuming that large (measured by verified emissions) 
and more professionalized companies in terms of trading activities (measured by whether or not a company 
opened a PHA) conduct trades involving large amounts, of a potentially recurring, standardized nature, one could 
argue that banks and exchanges might be important for these types of trades, while brokers may be responsible 
for the smaller, less standardized ones. This would also tie in with the fact that while banks transact the largest 
amount of any financial actor (Table 1) and may, therefore, cater to large clients, in terms of number of trading 
partners, brokers are more important as they interact with many smaller clients. 
These results are echoed in a survey of German companies liable under the EU ETS (Grünig et al. 2014), which 
found that companies with large trading volumes are more likely to follow a diversified trading strategy using 
different channels, such as the secondary market, OTC, or intermediaries. Companies with small trading volumes, 
on the other hand, often interact exclusively with one intermediary. This intermediary is often a broker or trader, 
but sometimes a bank or other financial institution. The authors found that reasons for a singular trading strategy 
via one intermediary are mostly related to the relatively high cost associated with other trading channels, which 
are only warranted at higher trading volumes – or if, for example, a company already has access to a particular 
exchange (e.g., EEX), since it also trades energy products there. 
Comparing the results of the outcome equation to an ordinary probit regression, without accounting for the 
selection process (Table 9 in the Annex), we see that the estimation results are very similar, both in terms of the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficients. For those regressions where we estimated a significant 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations, in particular ‘sold to broker’ and ‘bought from broker’, we 
found some differences in the magnitude and significance of coefficients. In the ordinary probit regression ‘sold to 
broker’, the coefficient on the logarithm of maximum emissions is no longer significant (while owning a PHA 
becomes marginally significant). This indicates that ex-ante smaller firms are more likely to sell to a broker (taking 
the selection process into account). Among the companies that traded, on the other hand, small and large 
companies are equally likely to sell to a broker. In the ordinary probit regression ‘bought from broker’, the sector 
dummy on cement becomes significant, indicating that ex-ante companies in the cement sector are not 
significantly more likely to buy from a broker than electricity companies, which holds for the subset of companies 
that traded. These variables are therefore likely to be affected by the unobservable variables driving the selection 
process in these two cases. 
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 The Different Roles of Banks 5.
In order to better understand the implications of banks exiting the market for EUAs on ETS companies, we 
extended the regression analysis of the previous section by means of semi-structured interviews with financial 
players and their clients. These interviews also give insights into the different roles banks played in and beyond 
the first trading period. While the focus of this section is on banks, many of these roles may have been played by 
trading houses or brokers as well, albeit on a smaller scale (e.g., for smaller clients or involving smaller volumes).  
In general, banks use a vertical or horizontal approach as their strategy in emissions trading. In this context, 
vertical means that they offer a broad set of services to their clients ranging from management services, 
brokerage, and information provision to hedging (e.g., Barclays Bank). A horizontal approach would focus, for 
example, on the entirety of services for companies in the energy sector. In this context, banks with a horizontal 
approach may target some services related to emissions trading in order to show competence on the carbon 
market. These banks, however, rather expect profits from larger energy infrastructure projects or activities on 
other energy markets than from trading on the carbon market as such. Most of the banks with lower transaction 
volumes on the market for EUAs fall under this category.  
Based on EUTL data analysis and interviews, the roles banks played in EU emissions trading can be classified 
into the following ten categories. 
First, similar to exchanges, banks facilitate trading in that they offer a platform on which other entities can carry 
out trades or offer the service to facilitate trades. We would expect that a bank that specializes in brokerage and 
acts as an intermediary would a) have transactions dispersed across the whole year, b) transact with a large 
number of trading partners, and c) have the same amount of EUAs flow out of its account as flow into the account 
during a short period of time. The bank AGEAS (Figure 4) may be a good example of this behavior as it traded 
with 118 distinctive partners during the first trading period, many of which were liable companies, while selling to 
88 distinct trading partners. AGEAS acquired permits in 652 transactions with an average size of 68,000 EUAs 
and sold in 1,084 transactions with an average size of 41,000 EUAs. Transactions were dispersed throughout the 
year, although the spikes in December each year (a delivery month for forwards and futures) still play a big role. 
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Figure 4 AGEAS Bank as an example of an intermediary/brokerage role  
 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
 
Second, banks may go beyond the intermediary role by providing further services by directly managing 
accounts. AGEAS, for example, is the direct account holder of three installations. It is not the only bank that 
managed liable accounts directly. In fact, Unicredit even managed the accounts of eight installations directly, as 
can be deduced from the information on Operator Holding Accounts (OHA) available on the EUTL. 
Third, some banks provide market information to their clients by publishing newsletters (e.g., Deutsche Bank or 
Barclays) and market analysis reports.  
Fourth, although most of the activities of banks increased liquidity on the market, some banks actually acted as a 
market maker, as did some utilities or oil companies (Betz and Schmidt 2015). Market makers have to constantly 
place bids and asks within a certain price corridor on exchanges and are rewarded by being granted access to 
these exchanges as well as special conditions. This role was also played by Barclays Bank, which in part 
accounts for it being responsible for the highest volume traded by any bank (Table 3). 
Fifth, banks may trade on their own account in order to generate profits. In contrast to ‘management service 
providers’, which make returns related to service activities offered (e.g., brokerage) or ‘technical service 
providers’, which make returns related to fees and charges, ‘speculative traders’ try to generate returns by 
speculating on the market for EUAs. Speculative trading may involve very short time periods in order to make 
profits within hours or days. Information on speculative activities was difficult to obtain in any of the interviews 
since those are often carried out by a different department within the same bank. According to Wallner et al. 
(2014), most banks have reduced purely speculative trading behavior given that this needs to be backed up with 
nearly the same amount of equity in order to comply with regulatory standards for banks. It is also very difficult to 
infer from the EUTL data whether banks might have made a profit or a loss from EU emissions trading. As noted 
above, the EUTL only displays physical transactions and no information about the price related to a transaction (if 
any), which complicates the estimation of gains and losses as prices have to be matched to trading volumes. The 
fact that banks were often counterparties in futures trading (see below) makes it even harder to estimate potential 
gains they made from trading, as the forward or futures contract could have been sold at any point in time before 
the physical transaction took place.  
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Sixth, banks may also borrow permits from companies and return them with interest (not buying them but 
rather using them as speculative capital). However, borrowing permits from other companies was not very 
common as the contract negotiations were burdensome as mentioned by our interview partners.  
Seventh, banks are partners for so-called maturity swaps of companies, which thus benefit from better 
conditions to obtain cash compared to the conventional credit conditions offered by banks. In this context, a 
company sells permits against cash on the market and at the same time buys a future from the exchange backed 
by a bank (which will only need to be paid for at the delivery date, with the exception of margins). Interviewees 
reported that companies did this over longer periods, which would require them to use their permits allocated for 
future years for compliance (borrowing) and buy a future or forward contract that would mature, for instance, at 
the end of the trading period.  
Eighth, from the second trading period onwards, when Kyoto units of the Clean Development Mechanism (CERs) 
or Joint Implementation (ERUs) were traded, banks helped companies in swapping EUAs against Kyoto units. 
This means they were swapping EUAs for CERs or ERUs by selling EUAs and simultaneously buying CERs or 
ERUs. This is a risk-free way of generating additional cash as long as there is a price differential between 
CERs/ERUs and EUAs. However, this swapping option is not unlimited since regulated companies can only use a 
certain share of Kyoto units for compliance. As KfW/ZEW (2009) noted, in Germany it is mostly large companies 
that take advantage of the ability to swap – even at relatively low spreads while other companies demand larger 
spreads due to perceived risks and transaction costs involved in swapping Kyoto units for EUAs.  
Ninth, some banks lower transaction costs by trading with their smaller credit clients which prefer to get all their 
services from their main bank (Heindl 2012a, 2012b).
4
 In this case, a bank will play the role of an aggregator and 
collect the surplus allowances of its clients to bring them on the market. These allowances may then be sold on 
the spot market or, as they often are, used to deliver forwards or futures, in particular to electricity companies. 
Finally, as indicated before, banks are major hedging partners and develop and offer derivative products to help 
manage price risk for regulated companies. In particular, electricity generators buy derivatives to hedge power 
forward sales. They acquire futures rather than EUAs in auctions or on the spot market due to higher capital costs 
and financial liquidity restrictions. These hedges are usually carried out by dedicated trading accounts (PHAs) of 
the electricity companies, rather than the accounts of individual installations. It is attractive for a bank to serve as 
a hedging partner, as it is given access to cheap capital and can, therefore, pursue cost-of-carry arbitrage; it can, 
for example, buy spot from a manufacturer, hold EUAs, and sell forwards or futures to electricity generators. KfW / 
ZEW (2014; 2015) also mentioned hedging as an important motive for becoming active on the market for the 
German companies surveyed in their report. 
                                                          
4
 Note, however, that Grünig et al. (2014) found that, at least in Germany, the main bank is often not the favored intermediary for small firms, but 
rather banks with dedicated carbon desks, or brokerage and trading houses. 
Roles of Banks    25 
Figure 5 A Barclays account as an example for an aggregator / a hedging partner role 
 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
 
Figure 5 shows how the role of aggregator and hedging partner might have worked using one of the accounts of 
Barclays Bank as an example. This account purchases smaller quantities throughout the year and then transfers 
a large amount (approximately equal to the sum of purchases) in December each year. As December was and is 
the standard maturity month for EUA forwards and futures, it is very likely that these peaks were deliveries of 
these derivatives. In a sense, therefore, a bank (account) that acted as an aggregator on the market for EUAs 
may at the same time have been a ‘hedging partner’. 
In order to give a broader indication of which companies were active in the forward and futures markets, Table 8 
shows those companies with the highest (absolute) transaction volumes on the days when forwards and futures 
were cleared. These companies were jointly responsible for 86 % of transaction volumes on those days. The 
largest total volume went through the account of LCH Clearnet (17 % of the total volume on those days), followed 
by financial actors, many of which had registered accounts at LCH Clearnet and were, therefore, able to clear 
futures (marked with an asterisk). Table 8 also shows the share of the respective company’s total trading volume 
during the first trading period that was conducted on one of those 16 days. In fact, LCH Clearnet transacted 91 % 
of its total transaction volume on those days, followed by Calyon Financial and UBS with 89 % and 82 %, 
respectively. We were also able to observe large utilities with considerable activity during those dates, as well as 
energy companies and a couple of industrial companies. However, even many of the smaller companies had a 
large share of their total transfers during the first trading period on these days (overall mean of 40 % for all 
companies in the dataset). This may be due to the fact that at the end of each year companies will have the best 
estimate of total verified emissions and their respective liability. 
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Table 8 Companies active on forward and future delivery days 
Company Vol 
on 
clearing 
days  
(M EUA) 
Share of  Company Vol 
on clearing 
days  
(M EUA) 
 
Share of  
company's 
total trading 
volume 
total 
trading 
volume 
on these 
days 
company's 
total trading 
volume 
total 
trading 
volume 
on these 
days 
Clearinghouse, exchanges Utilities 
LCH Clearnet 204 91% 17% ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE 40 67% 3% 
NordPool 9 11% 1% RWE AG 28 42% 2% 
BlueNext 6 5% 1% E.ON SE 25 35% 2% 
Financial actors SSE PLC 22 60% 2% 
UBS AG* 
11
9 
82% 10% ENEL SPA 18 27% 2% 
Calyon Financial* 71 89% 6% ENBW AG 18 57% 1% 
BARCLAYS PLC* 68 43% 6% GDF 16 19% 1% 
AGEAS SA/NV* 34 38% 3% ESSENT N.V. 16 59% 1% 
BNP PARIBAS* 33 72% 3% ALLIANDER N.V. 15 41% 1% 
MORGAN STANLEY* 25 58% 2% IBERDROLA SA 14 67% 1% 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP* 25 78% 2% CENTRICA PLC 13 35% 1% 
SOCIETE GENERALE 18 48% 1% DRAX GROUP PLC 12 56% 1% 
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 13 49% 1% CEZ A.S. 12 67% 1% 
COMMERZBANK AG 13 37% 1% VATTENFALL AB 12 35% 1% 
SAL. OPPENHEIM JR. & CIE. * 9 53% 1% Deeside Power Limited   8 25% 1% 
NUCLEAR LIABILITIES FUND 9 74% 1% VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT 7 33% 1% 
PCE Investors 8 67% 1% Sempra Energy Europe Ltd. 7 44% 1% 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO.* 8 34% 1% Energy 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG* 6 33% 1% ROYAL DUTCH SHELL* 24 41% 2% 
Industry BP PLC 18 41% 1% 
SAINT GOBAIN SA 19 39% 2% BHP BILLITON LIMITED 9 76% 1% 
RHODIA SA 10 43% 1% TOTAL S.A. 8 56% 1% 
* Have direct transactions with LCH Clearnet ('clearing accounts') 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
Note: All of the companies shown are involved in at least 1 % of the total volume transacted on the defined days (30/11-01/12/05; 19/21-21/12/05; 
30/11-01/12/06; 18-21/12/06; 30/11/07; 03/12/07; 17-19/12/07); * denotes accounts that had direct transactions with LCH Clearnet, which serves 
as the clearinghouse for the ECX ('clearing accounts'). 
 
Liable companies barely transacted with the London Clearing House directly. In fact, Shell was the only liable 
company owning a PHA that was able to trade with the LCH. In total, only 27 accounts (of a total of 11,000 OHAs 
and 1,000 PHAs) had any transactions with the LCH. Figure 6 shows 20 of these accounts, sorted by volumes 
transacted with the LCH. Transactions involving the LCH are compared with overall transactions of these 
accounts, indicating that some of them were, to a large extent, being used for clearing activities of futures 
contracts. 
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Figure 6 Clearing accounts: Transactions with LCH Clearnet vs. total transactions 
 
Source: EUTL, own estimation and illustration 
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 Conclusions 6.
This paper analyzes the role of the financial sector in EU emissions trading using both descriptive and regression 
analysis on the EUTL transfer dataset, as well as semi-structured interview techniques. It contributes to the 
literature by identifying and exploring the different roles which financial actors play in emissions trading and by 
suggesting why these may be important in facilitating trading, particularly at the beginning of a scheme. The result 
of the regression analysis indicates that different types of liable companies interact with financial actors to 
differing degrees. While larger companies with trading experience are more likely to interact with many different 
financial actors, in particular banks or exchanges, smaller, less professionalized companies are more likely to 
follow a singular trading strategy and to interact with brokers while they do this. 
Based on further EUTL data analysis and the outcomes of interviews with relevant stakeholders, we were able to 
show that banks, in particular, play several roles as participants in the EU ETS, acting as intermediaries, hedging 
partners, or service providers. Our results indicate that the fact that banks have been pulling out of the market, 
due to various reasons, might pose a bigger problem to those companies that rely on them to offer trades in large 
quantities and/or standardized products, such as forward or futures contracts. It is unclear at this stage if banks 
will continue to play this role or if other service and trading companies will take over their role - in particular as 
hedging counterparties - since they do not fall under the new EU regulations regarding financial markets (MiFID). 
Many of the other roles of banks as identified in this paper have in fact been played by other financial 
intermediaries as well (e.g., CER/ERU swaps). Therefore, we do not expect a major impact of the disengagement 
of banks on companies wishing to make use of these types of services. 
Since banks have also been responsible for the largest overall trading volume and have acted as market makers, 
their pulling out of the market may also raise concerns over liquidity - in particular, when one observes the rather 
low trading volumes recorded for emissions trading schemes without the participation of the financial sector, such 
as the South Korean scheme (Thomson Reuters / PointCarbon 2016). However, given the frequent and high 
auction volumes under the EU ETS since the start of the third trading period in 2013, the liquidity of the market 
seems to be less of a worry at present.  
Given that our data analysis is based on data for the first trading period (2005-2007), future research using data 
from the second trading period may be interesting and give additional insights on the more recent roles of the 
financial sector. However, researchers need to be aware of the major role banks and exchanges played in the 
VAT fraud, which is likely to have distorted the transfer data available for the second trading period substantially. 
It may, furthermore, be worthwhile to leave the level of companies active in emissions trading and take the 
viewpoint of a regulator that has to decide whether, and to what extent, non-liable financial actors should be 
allowed to participate in a trading scheme, thus enabling a more comprehensive view of the costs and benefits of 
the inclusion of the financial sector in emissions trading. 
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Table 9 Regression results: Probit model without sample selection 
 Sold to bank 
Bought 
from bank 
Sold to 
broker 
Bought 
from broker 
Sold to 
exchange 
Bought 
from 
exchange 
Short -0.78*** 0.56*** -1.06*** 0.59*** -0.66*** 0.64*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
ln(maximum emissions) 0.21*** 0.18*** -0.001 0.04** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of accounts 0.010 -0.0004 0.003 0.01** -0.004 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00) (0.004) (0.004) 
Has PHA  0.51*** 0.36** 0.26* -0.09 0.74*** 0.65*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Number of trades 0.005** 0.005** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Other combustion 0.29*** 0.21* -0.003 0.08 -0.32*** -0.03 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
Refineries -0.10 0.01 -0.19 -0.35 -1.09*** -0.18 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.41) (0.34) 
Iron, steel 0.19 0.28 -0.05 -0.20 -0.66*** -0.42 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.25) (0.29) 
Cement 0.33* 0.16 0.28* 0.34** -0.26 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) 
Glass 0.70*** 0.52*** -0.29* -0.12 -0.19 0.27 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) 
Ceramics 0.09 -0.07 0.32*** 0.14 0.22 0.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
Paper 0.13 -0.28 -0.07 0.01 -0.39** 0.34** 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15) 
Constant -3.61*** -3.87*** -0.34* -1.55*** -1.90*** -2.62*** 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19) (0.27) (0.26) 
Observations 3002 
Source: EUTL, own estimation 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (***significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *significant at the 90% level) 
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